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reason to think that justice is no natural virtue in this system. (IHM II,
vi [109b; B 35])
chapter x
In Conclusion: Living Wisely in the Darkness
two thomases: aquinas and reid
Having opened his Summa contra gentiles with some reflections on
 the office of the wise man, and having remarked that  among
all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is more perfect, more
noble, more useful, and more full of joy than any other (I,2,2),
Thomas Aquinas, in a passage unusual in his work for its use of
the first person singular pronoun, goes on to declare that  in the
name of the divine Mercy, I have the confidence to embark upon
the work of a wise man, even though this may surpass my powers
(I,2,2).1 That work, he says, is the work  of making known . . . the
truth that the Catholic faith professes, and of setting aside the
errors that are opposed to it (I,2,2). What follows these intro-
ductory comments is four rather lengthy books in which Aquinas
articulates Christian theology in the manner of a scientia, polemi-
cizing along the way against alternative positions.
Why does Aquinas think that articulating Christian theology in
scientific fashion, and polemicizing against alternatives, is a way
of exercising the office of a wise person? After citing Aristotle to
authorize his adherence to common usage, Aquinas remarks that
 the usage of the multitude . . . has commonly held that they are
to be called wise who order things rightly and govern them well.
He supports his view on this point of usage by appealing to Aris-
totle on this matter as well, remarking that  among other things
that men have conceived about the wise man, the Philosopher
includes the notion that  it belongs to the wise man to order
(I,1,1).
1
I am quoting from the translation by Anton C. Pegis, issued by the University of Notre
Dame Press (Notre Dame, Ind.) in 1975.
250
Conclusion 251
With this concept of the wise person in hand, Aquinas proceeds
to highlight some structural features of the practical arts and their
relation to each other.  The rule of government and order for all
things directed to an end must be taken from that end, he says.
 For, since the end of each thing is its good, a thing is then best
disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its end. Accordingly, a
condition of being a wise person within some practical art is
knowing the end, the goal, the telos, of that practice. Now most
artisans are of course concerned  with the ends of certain par-
ticular things, they do not reach to the universal end of all things.
They are therefore said to be wise with respect to this or that
thing (I,1,1). It is to be noted, however, that the various
practices to be found in human society do not constitute a mere
assemblage; many are related to each other as subordinate to
superordinate. One  functions as the governor and the ruler of
another because it controls its end. Thus, the art of medicine
rules and orders the art of the [pharmacist] because health, with
which medicine is concerned, is the end of all the medications
prepared by the art of the [pharmacist] (I,1,1). Suppose, then,
that there is an ultimate human telos; suppose even that there is
a telos of the universe and all that dwells therein.  The name of
the absolutely wise man . . . is reserved for him whose considera-
tion is directed to the end of the universe, which is also the origin
of the universe (I,1,1). Aquinas s idea  presupposed rather than
expressed  is that the person who possesses knowledge of the
ultimate end of all things in general, and of all practices in par-
ticular, will be of important if not indispensable aid to all those
who, in their ordering and governing activities, deal with more
limited ends.
When Aquinas declared that he would be so bold as to exercise
the office of the wise person, it was of the office of the absolutely
wise person that he was thinking. He would reflect on the end of
all things  which is God. Thus it is that what follows these intro-
ductory comments is a theological treatise. Of course, anyone
who has read beyond the first book of the Summa contra gentiles
knows that Aquinas speaks not just of God but of created things
as well. That s because theology is not just about God; it s also
about the cosmos and all things to be found therein  insofar as
they are related to God.
Correspondingly, it was not medical wisdom, political wisdom,
252 Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology
engineering wisdom, and so forth, that Aquinas had in mind
when he said that  the pursuit of wisdom is more perfect, more
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